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4. 	Venture Capital: A Geographical Perspective





A major focus of applied research on venture capital concerns the ‘equity gap’ – in other words, the lack of availability of small amounts of finance. In the case of formal (or institutional) venture capital funds, because of the fixed nature of most of the costs that investors incur in making investments it uneconomic for them to make small investments. Informal venture capital investors – or business angels – are able to make small investments because they do not have the overheads of fund managers and do not cost their time in the same way. However, most business angels, even when investing in syndicates alongside other business angels, lack sufficiently ‘deep pockets’ to fully substitute for the lack of venture capital fund investment. Hence, whereas the market for investments of under £250,000/$500,000 is served fairly effectively by business angels, and the over £5m/$10m market is satisfied by venture capital funds, there is a gap in the provision of amounts in the £250,000/$500,000 to £5m/$10m range which are too large for business angels but too small for professional investors. This gap is mostly experienced by new and recently started growing businesses. Government’s have responded in a variety of ways in an attempt to increase the supply of small scale, early stage venture capital (see Murray: Chapter 5 and Sohl, Chapter 15). 

However, much less attention has been given to regional gaps in the supply of venture capital – that is, the under-representation of venture capital investments in particular parts of a country relative to their share of national economic activity (e.g. their share of the national stock of business activity). If it is accepted that venture capital – both formal and informal – makes a significant contribution to the creation of new businesses and new industries then regions which lack venture capital will be at a disadvantage in generating new economic activity and technology clusters. 

This chapter reviews the literature on the geography of venture capital. It looks separately at informal venture capital and formal, or institutional, venture capital. The literature on the geography of informal venture capital is very limited and fairly superficial. There are enormous difficulties in identifying business angels and developing a database of investments, hence most studies have been based on small samples with limited geographical coverage or depth. Moreover, issues of geography, place and space have rarely been given attention in studies of the operation of the informal venture capital market. The literature on the geography of institutional venture capital is also limited. It has mainly been contributed by economic geographers. Because of the tendency for scholars to work in disciplinary ‘silos’ it means that this literature is largely unknown amongst ‘mainstream’ scholars of venture capital who are typically in the management and economics disciplines. A further consequence is that when scholars from such disciplines do write about the geographical aspects of venture capital they generally ignore these geographical contributions and treat such geographical concepts as place, space and distance in simplistic terms. Finally, in order to put boundaries on the scope of this chapter it is concerned exclusively with the geography of venture capital investing within individual countries. There is a separate literature on the internationalisation of venture capital (see Wright et al., 2005 for a review). 

The next section reviews what can be gleaned from the literature on the role of geography of the informal venture capital market (section 2). The chapter then moves on to consider the formal, or institutional, venture capital market, initially by considering outcomes, describing the uneven nature of venture capital investing, illustrated by the examples of the USA, Canada, the UK and Germany (section 3) and then works backwards to explanations, attributing this uneven geography of investing to the combination of the localised distribution of the venture capital industry and the localised nature of investing. The role of long distance flows of venture capital in reinforcing the clustering of venture capital investments is also discussed. Section 4 brings some of these earlier themes together in the form of a short case study of Ottawa, Canada, a thriving technology cluster. The intention is to show how economic activity is initially funded in emerging high tech clusters by a combination of ‘old economy’ business angels and the importing of institutional venture capital from elsewhere, and but over time, as it develops successful technology companies so a technology angel community emerges and it also develops its own indigenous supply of institutional venture capital funds. Section 5 draws the chapter to a conclusion with some thoughts on future research directions  and a brief consideration of the implications for policy. A fuller discussion of policy issues can be found in Chapter 5 of this volume.

4.2 	GEOGRAPHICAL ASPECTS OF THE INFORMAL VENTURE CAPITAL MARKET 
Business angels are very difficult to identify. They are not listed in any directories and their investments are not recorded. Consequently, research has generally been based on samples which are too small to be spatially disaggregated. Moreover, the identification of business angels is often based either on ‘snowballing’ or samples of convenience which have an in-built geographical bias. This has severely restricted the ability of researchers to explore either the geographical distribution of business angels and their investment activity or to compare the characteristics of business angels and their investment activity in different regions and localities. Some studies do make comparisons with findings from independent studies conducted in other regions and countries but the lack of consistency in methodologies, definitions, sampling frames and definitions render such comparisons highly suspect. However, since the majority of business angels are cashed-out entrepreneurs (up to 80% according to some studies) and other high net worth individuals, the size of the market in different regions is likely to reflect the geography of entrepreneurial activity and the geography of income and wealth, both of which have been shown to be unevenly distributed within countries (e.g. Armington and Acs, 2002; Keeble and Walker, 1994; Davidsson et al., 1994; Reynolds et al., 1995). 

4.2.1	The Location of Business Angels
The only study which has looked at the geographical distribution of business angels is by Avdeitchikova and Landstrőm (2005). Based on a ‘large’ (n=277) sample of informal investors in Sweden (defined as anyone who has made a non-collateral investments in private companies in which they did not have any family connections) they suggest that both investments (52%) and the amounts invested (77%) are disproportionately concentrated in metropolitan regions (which has 51% of the total population) . However, this is a less geographically concentrated distribution than is the case for institutional venture capital fund investments.

Regional comparative studies suggest that business angels also differ by region. For example, a study that was based on a large sample of Canadian business angels (n=299) (Riding et al., 1993) noted that business angels in Canada’s Maritime Provinces (Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island and New Brunswick) are distinctive in terms of the typical size of their investments, sectoral preferences, rate of return expectations and expected time to achieve an exit (Feeney et al., 1998). Investors in Atlantic Canada and Quebec are also the most parochial (63% and 58% of investments within 50 miles of home compared with a national average of 53%) (Riding et al., 1993). Johnstone (2001) makes an important contribution, suggesting that remote and declining industrial regions are likely to suffer from a mismatch between the supply of angel finance and the demand for this form of funding. He demonstrates that in the case of Cape Breton, in the province of Nova Scotia in Canada, the main source of demand for early stage venture capital is from knowledge-based businesses started by well-educated entrepreneurs (mostly graduates) with formal technical education and training who are seeking value-added investors with industry and technology relevant marketing and management skills and industrial contracts. However, the business angels in the region have typically made their money in the service economy (retail, transport, etc), have little formal education or training, are reluctant to invest in early stage businesses and are not comfortable with the IT sector. Moreover, their value-added contributions are confined to finance, planning and operations. This suggests that the informal venture capital market in ‘depleted communities’ is characterised by stage, sector and knowledge mismatches.





	New England (Wetzel, 1981)	California (Tymes and Krasner, 1983)	USA (Gaston, 1989)	Connecticut and Massachusetts (Freear et al., 1992; 1994)
				active angels	virgin angels
	(all figures in percentages)








Note:  *  50-150 miles

Table 4.1. Locational Preferences By Business Angels: Selected Studies


4.2.2 	Locational Preferences.  
Various survey-based studies in several countries have asked business angels if they have any geographical preferences concerning where they invest. These studies reveal that some angels have a strong preference to make their investments close to home while others impose no geographical limitations on where they will invest. In the USA Gaston (1989) reported that 72% of business angels wished to invest within 50 miles of home and only 7% had no geographical preferences. However, other US studies – based on smaller sample sizes and confined to specific regions – report that well under half of all business angels will limit their investing to within 50 miles of home (Table 4.1). Studies in other countries are equally inconsistent in their findings. For example, in Canada, a study of Ottawa angels reported that 36% imposed no geographical limits on their investments (Short and Riding 1989). In the UK, Coveney and Moore (1997) reported that 44% of angels would consider investing more than 200 miles or three hours travelling time from home, compared with only 15% whose maximum investment threshold was 50 miles or one hour. Scottish business angels are rather more parochial, but even here 22% would consider investing more than 200 miles or three hours from home, compared with 62% wanting to invest within 100 miles of home (Paul et al., 2003).

4.2.3	The Role of Location in the Investment Decision. 
Studies of how business angels make their investment decisions suggest that the location of potential investee companies is a relatively unimportant consideration, and much less significant than the type of product or stage of business development (Haar et al., 1988; Freear et al., 1992; Coveney and Moore, 1997; van Osnabrugge and Robinson, 2000). A more nuanced perspective is offered by Mason and Rogers (1996). Their evidence suggests that most angels do have a limit beyond which they preferred not to invest, but – to quote several respondents to their survey who used virtually the same phrase – “it doesn’t always work that way”. In other words, the location of an investment in relation to the investor’s home base appears to be a compensatory criterion (Riding et al. 1993), with angels prepared to invest in ‘good’ opportunities that are located beyond their preferred distance threshold. 

4.2.4	Locations of Actual Investments. 
Studies which have focused on the actual location of investments made by business angels reveals a much more parochial pattern of investing (Table 4.2). The proportion of investments located within 50 miles of the investor’s home or office ranges from 85% amongst business angels in Ottawa to 37% amongst business angels in Connecticut and Massachusetts. In the UK, Mason and Harrison (1994) found that two-thirds of investments by UK business angels were made within 100 miles of home. In other words, the actual proportion of long distance investments that are made is much smaller than might be anticipated in the light of the proportion of investors who report a preference for or willingness to consider long distance investments.

Reasons for the dominance of short distance investments
This dominance of local investing reflects several factors. First, it arises because of the effect of distance on an investor’s awareness of potential investment opportunities. Information flows are subject to ‘distance decay’, hence, as Wetzel (1983: 27) observed, “the likelihood of an investment opportunity coming to an individual’s attention increases, probably exponentially, the shorter the distance between the two 

	New England(Wetzel, 1981)	Connecticut and Massachusetts (Freear et al., 1992)	Ottawa (Short and Riding, 1989)	Canada (Riding et al., 1993)
	(all figures in percentages)
Less than 50 miles	58	37	85	53
50-300 miles	20	28	4	17
Over 300 miles/different country	22	36 (28+8)	11	29
Total	100	100	100	100

Table 4.2. 	Location Of Actual Investments Made By Business Angels: Selected Studies


parties.” Indeed, in the absence of an extensive proactive search for investment opportunities, combined with the lack of systematic channels of communication between investors and entrepreneurs, most business angels derive their information on investment opportunities from informal networks of trusted friends and business
associates (Wetzel, 1981; Aram, 1989; Haar et al., 1988; Postma and Sullivan, 1990; Mason and Harrison, 1994), who tend to be local (Sørheim, 2003). 

Second, business angels place high emphasis on the entrepreneur in their investment appraisal – to a much greater extent than venture capital funds do (Fiet, 1995; Mason and Stark, 2004). Their knowledge of the local business community means that by investing locally they can limit their investments to entrepreneurs that they either know themselves or who are known to their associates and so can be trusted. This point is illustrated by one Philadelphia-based angel quoted by Shane (2005: 22): “we have more contacts in the Philadelphia area. More of the people we trust are here in the Philadelphia area. So therefore we are more likely to come to some level of comfort or trust with investments that are closer.” 

A third reason is the tendency for business angels to be hands-on investors in order to minimise agency risk (Landström, 1992). Maintaining close working relationships with their investee businesses is facilitated by geographical proximity (Wetzel, 1983). Landström’s (1992) research demonstrates that distance is the most influential factor in determining contacts between investors and is more influential than the required level of contact.  This, in turn, suggests that the level of involvement is driven by the feasibility of contact rather than need. Furthermore, active investors give greater emphasis to proximity than passive investors (Sørheim and Landström, 2001). Proximity is particularly important in crisis situations where the investor needs to get involved in problem-solving. As one of the investors in the study by Paul et al. study (2003: 323) commented “if there’s a problem I want to be able to get into my car and be there in the hour. I don’t want to be going to the airport to catch a plane.”  

Finally, angels need to monitor their investments. This is often done by serving on the board of directors. It is desirable that the angel can travel to, attend and return in a day in order to minimise their travel costs. Some angels prefer to monitor their investments by making frequent visits to the businesses in which they invest, described by one angel in Shane’s study as “seeing them sweat” (Shane, 2005: 22). This is much easier to do if the investment is local. Avedeitchikova and Landstrőm (2005) provide statistical support for these explanations. In their study of Swedish informal investors, they found that investors who rely on personal social and business networks as their primary method for sourcing deals, and active investors who provide hands-on support to their investee businesses, are the most likely to invest close to their home/office.

Some studies have further observed that experienced angels have the greatest awareness of the benefits of investing close to home. Freear et al. (1992; 1994) noted that whereas 38% of virgin angels had no geographical restrictions on where they would be prepared to invest, this fell to 24% amongst active angels (see Table 4.1). In a study of UK investors, Lengyl and Gulliford (1997:10) noted that whereas the majority (67%) of investors gave preference to investee companies which were located within an hour’s drive, actual investors placed an even bigger emphasis on distance in their future investments, with 83% indicating that they would prefer their future investments to be within 100 miles of where they lived. 

The characteristics of long distance investments
Nevertheless, long distance investments do occur. In studies of New England (Wetzel, 1981; Freear et al., 1992) and Canada (Riding et al., 1993) between 22% and 36% of investments were over 300 miles from the investor’s home or office (see Table 4.2). In the UK, Mason and Harrison (1994) found that one-third of investments were in businesses located more than 100 miles from the investor’s home. Even in studies that have reported very high levels of local investing, at least 1 in 10 investments were over a long distance. For example, 11% of investments made by Ottawa-based business angels were over 300 miles away (Short and Riding, 1989), while in Finland, 14% of investments were over 500km away from the investor’s home (Lumme et al., 1998). 

Long distance investing is distinctive in several respects. First, in terms of investors, those who have industry-specific investment preferences (including technology preferences) are more willing to make long distance investments, and the pattern of their actual investments support this preference (Lengyl and Gulliford, 1997). Paul et al. (2003) suggest that the willingness of angels to make non-local investments is related to the funds that they have available to invest and the number of investments that they have made. They note, for example, that distance is not an issue for ‘super-angels’ with more than £500,000 available to invest.  Such investors are also more likely to be well-known and so more likely to be approached by entrepreneurs in distant locations. The ‘personal activity space’ of angels is also relevant. Investors with other interests elsewhere in the country will look for additional investments in these locations in order to reduce the opportunity costs of travelling. Second, certain deal characteristics are associated with long distance investing. Size of investment is important, with angels willing to invest further afield when making a £100,000 investment than a £10,000 investment (Innovation Partnership, 1993). The amount of involvement required is also relevant, with one angel observing that an investment requiring “a one day week involvement is going to be closer than [one which requires] a one day a month involvement” (Innovation Partnership, 1993). Third, angels will make long distance investments if someone from the location in which the business is based that they know and trust is co-investing with them.

From this fragmentary literature it can be concluded that there is not a national informal venture capital market. Rather, in view of the dominance of short distance investing it is best described as comprising a series of overlapping local/regional markets. Localities and regions differ in terms of both the numbers of business angels and their investment capabilities. There are also more subtle, but equally significant, differences in terms of the characteristics of investors, their investment preferences and the nature of the hands-on support which they can provide to investee companies. It follows from this that informal venture capital is not equally available in all locations. Nevertheless, some long distance investing does occur. However, there is little support from the available evidence to suggest that regions with a deficiency of informal venture capital can import their capital needs from elsewhere. Indeed, in their exploratory study of long distance investing by business angels in the UK Harrison et al. (2003) suggest that investors in the South East of England – the most economically dynamic and most entrepreneurial region in the UK – are the least likely to make long distance investments, and long distance investments in technology businesses are most likely to flow from economically less dynamic regions and into the South East region (which contains the major technology clusters).

4. 3. 	INSTITUTIONAL VENTURE CAPITAL: A GEOGRAPHICAL ANALYSIS
4.3.1	Definitions
Whereas the informal venture capital market comprises high net worth individuals investing their own money in unquoted companies, the formal – or institutional – venture capital market consists of venture capital firms – in other words, professional fund managers who are investing other peoples’ money. Most venture capital firms are ‘independents’ which raise their finance from financial institutions (e.g. banks, insurance companies, pension funds) and other investors (e.g. wealthy families, endowment funds, universities, companies). The investors in the funds managed by venture capital firms (termed ‘limited partners’) are attracted by the potential for superior returns from this asset class but lack the resources and expertise to invest directly in companies themselves. Moreover, as they are only allocating a small proportion of their investments to this asset class (typically a maximum of 1-2%) it is more convenient to invest in funds managed by venture capital firms (who are termed the ‘general partners’) who have specialist abilities in deal selection, deal structuring and monitoring. This enables venture capital firms to deal more efficiently with asymmetric information than other types of investor. Venture capital firms also have skills in providing value-adding services to their investee businesses and securing an exit for the investment which maximises returns. The other, much smaller category, of venture capital firm is ‘captives’. These are venture capital firms that are subsidiaries of financial institutions (especially banks) or non-financial corporations and who raise their investment funds from their parent organisation. (See Cumming, Fleming and Schweinbacher, Chapter 6 for a more detailed discussion).

Three smaller types of institutional investors are also of note. First, some non-financial corporations make venture capital investments for strategic reasons associated with R&D or market considerations, an activity which is termed corporate venturing. Second, some countries have venture capital funds that are funded entirely by investments by private individuals and who qualify for tax incentives. Examples include the UK’s Venture Capital Trusts and Canada’s Labor-Sponsored Venture Capital Funds (Ayayi, 2004). Third, in many countries there are government-funded venture capital funds which have been established for economic development reasons usually in regions which lack private sector venture capital funds (Hood, 2000).

4.3.2	Location of Investments
The availability of information on the geographical distribution of venture capital investing is rather poor. The main source of information is in the form of highly aggregated statistics produced annually by national venture capital associations or by organisations acting on their behalf. However, this simply records the location of investments by region, offers limited disaggregation by type of investment and provides no information on investment source. A further concern relates to the comprehensiveness of the coverage (Karaömerlioglu and Jacobsson, 2000). Members of national venture capital associations tend to be skewed towards larger investors, including those which might not be regarded as belonging to the venture capital industry​[1]​, whereas many small-scale local investors are not members and so are excluded. Investments by most corporate investors (i.e. non-financial companies making strategic minority investments in small firms) and business angels, including 
	$	%	number	%
Alaska/Hawaii/Puerto Rico	17,044,900 	0.1	                         5	0.2
 Colorado 	618,597,900 	2.8	                       80  	2.6
 Washington DC/Metroplex 	966,841,500 	4.3	                     194     	6.4
 Los Angeles/Orange County 	1,501,132,000 	6.7	                    176 	5.8
 Midwest 	773,419,400 	3.5	                    147	4.8
 New England 	2,672,148,900 	12.0	                    398	13.1
 North Central 	319,268,200 	1.4	                     60 	2.0
 Northwest 	964,114,500 	4.3	                     156	5.1
 NY Metro 	1,865,528,600 	8.3	                     168	5.5
 Philadelphia Metro 	580,389,900 	2.6	                       90	3.0
 Sacramento/N. California	 80,262,200 	0.4	                       15	0.5
 San Diego 	1,035,312,000 	4.6	                     125	4.1
 Silicon Valley 	7,901,433,500 	35.4	                     939	30.9
 South Central 	54,604,000 	0.2	                        4	0.1
 Southeast 	1,219,747,600 	5.5	                     204	6.7
 SouthWest 	590,206,100 	2.6	                      79	2.6
 Texas 	1,103,720,900 	4.9	                    167	5.5
 Upstate NY 	59,391,300 	0.3	                       30	1.0
 Other US 	57,099,000 	0.3	                         2	0.1
Grand Total 	22,380,262,400 	100	                 3,039 	100

Source: PriceWaterhouseCoopers/National Venture Capital Association Money Tree™ Report (http://www.pwcmoneytree.com/moneytree/index.jsp (​http:​/​​/​www.pwcmoneytree.com​/​moneytree​/​index.jsp​))

Table 4.3 	The Location Of Venture Capital Investments In The USA, 2005


business angel syndicates, are also not covered. There are some commercial sources of data which do provide deal specific information (including locations of investor and investee business). However, these suffer from a lack of comprehensive coverage, being biased towards larger deals.

In the USA venture capital investments are highly concentrated at all spatial scales: regional, state and metropolitan area. The pattern at the regional scale is bi-coastal, with venture capital investing concentrated in California, New England and New York (Table 4.3). Within individual states venture capital is concentrated in cities. At the metropolitan area scale just 10 such areas attracted 68% of all investments in 1997-98, with just two – San Francisco and Boston – accounting for 39% (Zook, 2002). Equally, there are large swathes of the USA, including much of the south and mid-west, which has attracted relatively little venture capital investing. The geography of venture capital investing closely relates to the locations of high tech clusters (Florida and Kenney, 1988a; 1988b; Florida and Smith, 1991; 1992). 


















Note: * companies may receive more than one investment in a year, hence the number of financings exceeds the number of companies raising finance

Source: Thomson Macdonald (http://www.canadavc.com (​http:​/​​/​www.canadavc.com​))

Table 4.4 Location of Venture Capital Investments in Canada, by Province, 2005


Turning to Europe, it should first be noted that the definition of venture capital is rather broader than is the case in North America, and includes private equity firms which invest in corporate restructuring situations such as management buyouts, institution-led buyouts and public-to-private deals. These deals are typically very large, usually well in excess of £10m. The geographical distribution of venture capital investing in the UK favours London and the South East (Table 4.5) (Mason and Harrison, 2002). These regions have the largest location quotients – a simple 

















Note: * location quotient divides a region’s share of total venture capital investment by its share of the total population of businesses registered for VAT. A value of greater than one indicates that venture capital investments are over-represented in that region. A value of less than one indicates that venture capital is under-represented in that region 

Source: British Venture Capital Association, Report on Investment Activity

Table 4.5. Location of Venture Capital Investments in the United Kingdom, by Region, 2001-2003 inclusive


statistical measure to show whether a region has more, or less, than its ‘expected’ share of venture capital investments by dividing this figure with some measure of the region’s share of national economic activity (in this case the business stock). The only other regions with more than their expected shares of venture capital investments by amount invested (indicated by a location quotient greater than unity) are the East Midlands and West Midlands. Regions with the lowest location quotients are in the ‘north’, notably Wales, Northern Ireland, Yorkshire and The Humber, the North West and North East. Because of the dominance of MBO investments in the UK there is a much weaker relationship between venture capital investing and high tech clusters (Martin et al., 2002). However, early stage investments continue to be disproportionately concentrated in London, the South East and Eastern regions and are more closely linked to high tech clusters (such as Cambridge) and more generally to the locational distribution of high-tech firms (Mason and Harrison, 2002).
 
A number of other West European countries, notably France, also exhibit high levels of geographical concentration of venture capital investments in just one or two regions (Martin et al., 2002). In Germany, 65% of total investment in 2003 and 2004 was concentrated in just three of the fifteen federal states – Bavaria, Baden-Wurttemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia (Fritsch and Schilder, 2006). Nevertheless, venture capital investments are less geographically concentrated in Germany than in other countries, with five states having location quotients greater than unity (Martin et al., 2005).

Little attention has been given to the extent to which these patterns of investing exhibit stability over time. In the UK the regional distribution of venture capital investments became less unevenly distributed during the 1990s compared with a decade earlier. The dominance of London and the South East was reduced (declining location quotients), while the older industrial regions, such as the East and West Midlands and Yorkshire and The Humber, increased their shares of venture capital investments. However, this gain was mainly in the form of management buyouts; early stage investments continue to be concentrated in London and the South East (Mason and Harrison, 2002). In the USA the investment ‘bubble’ of the late 1990s – caused by a large inflow of capital into the venture capital sector, resulting in more, and larger, investments – did lead to a short-lived spatial diffusion in investment activity as venture capital firms had to look further afield for investment opportunities. However, in the subsequent investment downturn post-2000 venture capital firms quickly reversed this geographical expansion in investment activity to re-focus on investments closer to home (Green, 2004). Indeed, the share of investing by value in the top three states of California, Massachusetts and Texas has increased from 54% in the pre-‘bubble’ period (1995-98) to 55% in the ‘bubble’ years (1999-2000) and to 61% in the immediate post-‘bubble’ period (2001-2002)

4.3.3 Explaining the geographical concentration of venture capital investments
This uneven geographical distribution of venture capital investments arises from the combination of the clustering of the venture capital industry in a relatively small number of cities, and the localised nature of venture capital investing.

The spatial clustering of venture capital firms
Venture capital firms are clustered in just a small number of cities, typically major financial centres and cities in high tech regions. Since most venture capital firms have only a single office, including branch offices has only a minor effect in reducing this high level of spatial clustering. In the USA venture capital offices are concentrated in San Francisco, Boston and New York. In Canada the main centre for venture capital firms is Toronto (59%), with smaller concentrations in Calgary, Montreal (both 9%) and Vancouver (8%). In the UK 71% of venture capital firms have their head offices in Greater London. There is greater dispersal in Germany. Munich is the biggest single host to venture capital firms but accounts for less than 20% of the total (Fritsch and Schilder, 2006). In total, six cities account for 65% of venture capital firms: nevertheless, all of them are major banking and financial centres (Martin et al., 2005). 

The concentration of venture capital firms in financial centres reflects the origins of many of them as offshoots of other financial institutions (notably banks). It also offers access to the pools of knowledge and expertise that venture capital firms require to find deals, organise investments and support their portfolio companies. Hence a location in a financial centre enables appropriately qualified staff to be recruited and provides proximity to other financiers, entrepreneurs, legal, accounting and consultancy firms and head-hunters during the investment process. The USA is unusual in having such a large proportion of venture capital firms located in Silicon Valley, a high tech region. In contrast to the venture capital firms in financial centres, these firms have typically been started by successful technology entrepreneurs and raised a lot of their funding from local high net worth individuals (particularly wealthy cashed-out entrepreneurs). Technology regions in other countries – such as Cambridge in the UK and Ottawa in Canada - typically have only a handful of local venture capital firms, and ‘import’ much of their funding from venture capital firms based in the major financial centres (London, Toronto, etc). However, these local venture capital firms have often been established by successful local technology entrepreneurs (e.g. Amadeus in Cambridge, started by Hermann Hauser, and Celtic House in Ottawa, started and initially funded by Terry Matthews), and illustrates how technology clusters benefit from the institution building activities of such individuals.
 
The localised nature of venture capital investing
The clustering of venture capital offices need not necessarily lead to the uneven geographical distribution of venture capital investments – the money could be invested in distant regions. But in practice venture capital investing is characterised by spatial biases which favour businesses located close to where the venture capitalists themselves are located. Florida and Smith (1991; 1992) have observed that venture capital firms located in high tech clusters tend to restrict their investing to the cluster. Powell et al. (2002) report that just over half of all biotech firms in the USA attracted venture capital investment from local sources. This proportion was even higher amongst smaller, younger, more science-focused firms and amongst firms in the main biotech clusters (Boston, San Francisco and San Diego). Moreover, the tendency for venture capital firms to invest locally increased during the 1990s. In the case of internet investing, Zook (2005) points to a strong statistically-significant correlation between the offices of venture capital firms and the number of investments at all spatial scales from five-digit zip code to metropolitan statistical area, with the strongest correlation for early stage investments. Martin et al. (2005) similarly report a strong tendency for German venture capital firms to invest locally, with most Länder dependent on local venture capital firms for investment. On average nearly half of all firms raising venture capital have been funded by local investors, with this proportion rises to 68% in the case of the Bayern region which is centred on Munich.

This strong spatial proximity effect arises because of the absence of publicly available information on new and young businesses. Their unproven business models, untested management teams, new technologies and inchoate markets all represent key sources of risk and uncertainty for investors (Sorenson and Stuart, 2001). Venture capitalists seek to overcome this uncertainty about the future prospects of potential investee businesses by information sharing with other investors, consultants, accountants and a wide range of other actors. Information sharing of this type is built on mutual trust that has been earned through repeated interaction, while the nature of this information flow tends to personal and informal and therefore hard to conduct over distance. As a consequence, less information is available about businesses in distant locations. Making local investments is therefore one of the ways in which venture capital firms can reduce uncertainty, compensate for ambiguous information and thereby minimise risk (Florida and Kenney, 1988a; Florida and Smith, 1991). This reliance on personal and professional contacts – what one venture capitalist terms “Rolodex power” (Jurvetson, 2000: 124) – can be seen at every stage in the venture capital investment process: deal flow generation, deal evaluation and post-investment relationships. 

Deal Flow. At the deal flow stage, venture capitalists rely on their connections and relationships to find the best deals (Zook, 2005). Most venture capital firms are inundated with business plans and have to develop systems which allow them to quickly identify and focus on those which have the best prospects for success. There are two sources of deal flow: deals which come in cold and those which are referred by the venture capitalist firm’s network – for example, law firms, accountancy firms, other venture capitalists and entrepreneurs. Venture capitalists are unable to rely on the information provided by the entrepreneur in deals which come in without an introduction. Instead, they rely on their networks – which tend to be local – as a means of receiving deal flow which has already been screened for relevance and quality. As one venture capitalist quoted by Zook (2005: 83) explained, “I depend on someone I know to alert me to good deals. If I don’t know this person at all and if they’re coming in totally cold, they have to say something really compelling to get me look at it.” Moreover, venture capitalists can place a high level of trust in the quality of these referrals because these organisations and individuals concerned are putting their reputation on the line when they refer deals to venture capitalists. 
Deal Evaluation. The outcome of the initial screening is a much smaller number of opportunities which the investor thinks have potential. These undergo a detailed evaluation. As Banatao and Fong (2000: 302) observe, “at this stage the venture capitalist’s contacts in his Palm Pilot are his best friend.” Venture capitalists use their extensive contacts to research the background of the entrepreneurs, the viability of the market, likely competition already in place or on the horizon and protection of the intellectual property. At the start-up and early stages of investing considerable emphasis is placed on the people. What have they done? Are they credible? Do they have the right integrity and ethics? This is particularly the case in situations where the investor believes in the technology but there is no industry and market (von Berg and Kenney, 2000). In such situations – before a dominant design or standard has emerged – venture capitalists “have to bet on the entrepreneurs presenting the business plan” (von Berg and Kenney, 2000: 1152). It is easier and quicker for a venture capitalist to check an entrepreneur’s résumé if he or she is local by using their own knowledge and local connections.  The quality of information is also likely to be better (Zook, 2004). Several Ottawa-based venture capitalists commented on how easily due diligence could be done on a local entrepreneur (Harrison, et al., 2004: 1064): 

“This is a community where most of the people are spin-outs of spin-outs. Two phone calls and I can find out everything … For the most part, you are dealing with teams and at least some of the team members come from the Ottawa community … Because I have six or seven investments in semiconductors, there are not many people in the Ottawa area in the semiconductor industry that I don’t already know or know someone who knows them, or who was worked with them in the past and so on.”

“Ottawa is a small town, so typically the individual worked at Nortel at some stage in his career and you can find someone who worked alongside him at one point.”

“I look at where they worked … If they’ve worked at half a dozen places there’s got to be one of those places where I know somebody.”

So, as Zook (205: 81) notes, “limiting investments to nearby firms produces easier and faster access to an entrepreneur’s references, which can often be double-checked by a venture capitalist’s own personal connections and knowledge.”

Post-investment relationships. The local focus becomes even more important once an investment is made. Venture capitalists do not only provide finance; they also monitor the performance of their investee companies to safeguard their investment, usually by taking a seat on the board of directors, setting goals and metrics for the companies to meet and supporting their portfolio companies with advice and mentoring in an effort to enhance their performance. They may even play a role in managing the company in the case of young scientist-led technology businesses. Supporting and monitoring their investments – which is an important part of managing the risk and accounts for a significant proportion of a venture capitalist’s time – also emphasises the importance of proximity.  Even though some forms of support do not require close contact there will nevertheless be many occasions when face-to-face contact is required and the venture capital firm will incur high costs each time a non-local firm is visited. It is undoubtedly the case that geographical proximity plays an important role in both the level and quality of support that businesses are able to obtain from their venture capital investors (Zook, 2004; 2005). First, venture capitalists can work more closely with their investee companies in their support and advisory roles when they are located nearby. Second, venture capitalists have abundant contacts and deep knowledge of particular industries: providing referrals to these sources of expertise is an important value-added contribution that venture capitalists make. This social network is more readily tapped when investee businesses are geographically proximate to the venture capitalist (Powell et al., 2002; Zook, 2005). Third, a further benefit which accrues when the venture capitalists and investee businesses are geographically proximate is that “unplanned encounters at restaurants or coffee shops, opportunities to confer in the grandstands during Little League baseball games or at soccer matches, or news about a seminar or presentation all happen routinely …” (Powell et al., 2002: 294). In short, it is precisely because venture capital is more than just the provision of capital that geographical proximity is important (Hellman, 2000: 292).  

Summary. In their efforts to minimise risk and uncertainty venture capitalists place a heavy reliance on their network of contacts to source quality deals, evaluate these deals, provide timely assistance to their portfolio companies and monitor their performance. This favours local investing because all of these activities become increasingly difficult to undertake over long distances (Zook, 2005).  

4.3.4 	Venture Capital as a Location Factor
This strong emphasis on local investing by venture capital firms can also attract businesses from other regions where venture capital is lacking and which are seeking to raise finance. This is well illustrated by Zook (2002; 2005) in his account of the geography of internet businesses. He notes that the importance of obtaining venture capital, combined with its limited mobility, was a significant factor in encouraging internet entrepreneurs in other parts of the USA to move to the San Francisco area during the emergent phase of then industry in the 1990s, either prior to starting their business or soon after founding a business elsewhere. A mix of both push and pull factors lay behind this trend. First, the venture capitalists in San Francisco were very receptive to approaches for funding by internet entrepreneurs in this period: those “venture capitalists who had been scanning for the next promising breakthrough jumped on the opportunity of the internet and began to be fund and be approached by a wide variety of internet entrepreneurs” (Zook, 2002: 162). However, venture capitalists in other locations often “didn’t get it” – they did not know, understand or believe in the internet industry - and so were more likely to reject funding proposals from internet entrepreneurs. Second, the lessons from the successes of Netscape and Yahoo! was the importance of speed to market in order to secure first-mover advantages. Thus, the strategy of internet entrepreneurs during the internet frenzy of the late 1990s was to “get big fast”. This required raising venture capital so that they could quickly scale-up, hiring the resources, developing routes to market and so on in order to gain competitive advantage. Internet entrepreneurs also recognised the value that venture capital investors could add through their networks and knowledge. However, ‘smart money’ in particular invests close to home (Zook, 2005). Thus, location became a strategic choice for internet entrepreneurs: “entrepreneurs had to go to Silicon Valley because that was where the money was” (Zook, 2005: 61). 

4.3.5	Demand-side factors
Until now the discussion has been considering supply side factors as a reason for the geographical concentration of venture capital investing. However, the presence or absence of venture capital also influences the demand side. A further consequence of the localisation of venture capital firms and their investment activity is that knowledge of venture capital investing varies from place to place (Thompson, 1989). This, in turn, has implications for the demand for venture capital (Martin et al., 2005). Knowledge and learning about venture capital will spread through the local business community in areas where venture capitalists are concentrated. Thus, both entrepreneurs and intermediaries, including accountants, bankers, lawyers and advisers, will have a greater understanding of the role and benefits of venture capital, what types of deals venture capitalists will consider investing in and the mechanics of negotiating and structuring investments. And, as noted earlier, the connections that lawyers, accountants and others have with venture capital firms means that the businesses that they refer for funding will be given serious consideration. The overall effect is to raise the demand for venture capital in locations where venture capital is already established. As Martin et al. (2002: 136) observe:

A strong mutually reinforcing process seems to be at work: venture capitalists emerge and develop where there is a high level of SME – and especially innovative SME – activity and this in turn stimulates further expansion of the local venture capital market which in turn contributes yet further to the formation and development of local SMEs, and so on.”

In areas which have few or no venture capital firms, in contrast, knowledge amongst entrepreneurs and the business support network will be weak and incomplete, intermediaries will lack connections with venture capital firms and, perhaps most significantly of all, will be less competent in advising their clients on what it takes to be ‘investable’. The effect is to depress demand for venture capital.

4.3.6	 Long distance investing
The discussion thus far has also emphasised the localised nature of venture capital investing. However, it is important to recognise that long distance investing also occurs. 

The effect of long distance investing is actually to reinforce the geographical clustering of venture capital investments, rather than producing a more dispersed distribution of investments, because it “flow[s] mainly to areas with established concentrations of high tech businesses” (Florida and Smith, 1992: 192). The best evidence on venture capital flows is by Florida and Smith (1991; 1992) for the USA. They note that venture capital firms that are based in financial centres such as New York and Chicago make most of their investments in distant places, typically high-tech regions. This contrasts with the venture capital firms in these high technology regions which make a high proportion of their investments locally, although some long distance investing occurs. Powell et al. (2000) similarly note for the biotechnology industry that New York money invests in the Boston, San Diego and the rest of the country whereas both Boston and San Francisco investors tend to invest within-state. Likewise, in Germany venture capital firms in the major clusters of venture capital make a significant minority of their investments in the Bayern region, centred on Munich which is a major technology cluster. Indeed, Bayern is the second most important region, after their own local region, for investments by venture capital firms, accounting for 29% of investments by Hamburg-based venture capitalists and by 25% of those based in Dusseldorf (Martin et al., 2005). 

The key point is that long distance venture capital investments typically occur in the context of the syndication of investments between non-local and local investors (see Wright and Lockett, 2003 and Manigart et al, 2006 for discussions of syndication in venture capital). Sorenson and Stuart (2001: 1582-3) have observed that “venture capitalists expand … their active investment spaces over time … primarily through joining syndicates with lead venture capitalists in distant communities.” Syndication arises because young, growing businesses – particularly technology businesses - typically require several rounds of investment before they are successful, with each round involving larger amounts. However, venture capital firms seek to mitigate risk through diversification, investing in a portfolio of businesses, some of which they hope will be successful, offsetting the losses from unsuccessful investments. Clearly, the initial investor would cease to have a diversified portfolio if it continued to provide all of the funding that a business needed. Investee businesses also benefit from having additional investors co-funding later rounds because they are able to access a wider range of value-added skills. Indeed, their initial investor’s value-added skills may be more appropriate to businesses at their start-up or early growth, whereas businesses which have successfully negotiated this stage will require a different set of value-added contributions which their initial investor may not possess. Because of the presence of a local lead investor distance is not important to these later stage co-investors, who themselves can either be local or non-local. They are willing to trust the local venture capital fund to undertake the deal evaluation, monitoring and support functions, including taking a seat on the board, leaving them to take a purely passive role. If the long distance investors do contribute value-added functions then they are of a type that does not require close contacts with the investee business. There is a strong reciprocal effect in syndication, with the local investor likely to be invited by the other venture capitalists into deals that they lead, which serves to reinforce the trust factor. Thus, syndication is a particular feature of longer established venture capital firms. Florida and Kenney (1988a: 47) suggest that “investment syndication is perhaps the crucial ingredient in the geography of the venture capital industry.” 

4.4	 VENTURE CAPITAL CLUSTERS AND TECHNOLOGY CLUSTERS: THE CASE OF OTTAWA
It is widely thought that the local availability venture capital is critical in incubating and sustaining entrepreneurially-based high tech clusters. As DeVol (2000: 25 emphasis added) comments: “by financing new ideas venture capitalists are catalysts instrumental in building a cluster as they provide a means for new firms to be formed.” In other words, it is suggested that a well functioning venture capital infrastructure is required for a regional technology cluster to develop. But this contradicts evidence from Silicon Valley (Saxenian, 1994) as well as other clusters such as Ottawa (Mason et al., 2002), Washington DC (Feldman, 2001) and Cambridge (Garnsey and Heffernan, 2005) that venture capital lags rather than leads the emergence of entrepreneurial activity. However, venture capital is needed for the sustained growth and development of a cluster (Llobrera et al., 2000): without venture capital a cluster is likely to stagnate or decline (Feldman, 2001; Feldman et al., 2005). 

4.4.1	The Ottawa Technology Cluster: an overview
This process is illustrated by Ottawa, Canada’s capital city, which is one of the main regions for venture capital investing in Canada. (See Shavinina, 2004 for an overview of Ottawa’s technology cluster). It currently has around 1,500 technology companies which employ around 70,000 workers (down from a peak of 85,000 at the peak of the technology boom in 2000). Over 75% of Canada’s telecoms R&D is undertaken in Ottawa. It is the location for several of the federal government’s R&D facilities and is also the home of many leading private sector technology companies, including Nortel Networks, Newbridge Networks (acquired by Alcatel in 2000), Corel Corporation, JDS-Uniphase and Mitel Corporation – although many of these companies underwent substantial retrenchment during the post-2000 technology downturn. Nortel undertakes a large share of its worldwide research in Ottawa. Recognition of Ottawa as a centre for telecoms technology has led to global companies such as Cisco Systems, Nokia, Cadence Design Systems and Premisys Telecommunications seeking a presence in the region during the late 1990s either through greenfield site development or the acquisition of local companies.

Ottawa’s emergence as a high technology cluster is largely attributable to the start-up and growth of entrepreneurial companies over the past 40-50 years. Its origins date back to the early post-war period with the founding of Computing Devices of Canada Ltd in 1948 as a spin-out from the government’s National Research Council (NRC) Laboratories to produce military computer hardware. Both NRC and other Government research labs have been the origin of many other spin-outs since then. A further significant building block was the decision of Northern Telecom (the fore-runner of Bell Northern Research and later Nortel Networks) to move its R&D facilities from Montreal to Ottawa in the 1950s. This facility has gone on to become one of the largest and most innovative telecommunications research centres in the world, although has contracted since 2000. It has also been a significant source of spin-outs over the years. A further boost to the cluster occurred in the mid 1970s with the closure of Microsystems International - a subsidiary of Northern Telecom - one of the earliest developers of semiconductor technology following a temporary downturn in the chip business. The company had attracted a large number of highly skilled IT engineers and scientists to Ottawa. Following the closure some of the redundant workers started their own companies. More than 20 start-ups can be attributed to former Microsystems employees. 

4.4.2	Venture Capital in the Early Stages of Cluster Development
The key point is that the initial emergence and early growth of Ottawa’s technology cluster occurred in the absence of local sources of venture capital. One observer noted in 1991 that compared to technology clusters in the USA, “Ottawa is conspicuous by its … low venture capital investment” (Doyle, 1991). Indeed, prior to the 1990s the only sources of venture capital in Ottawa were provided by Quebec lumber companies which began to invest in local high tech companies in the 1960s. One of these companies was acquired by Noranda which went on to create Noranda Enterprises, Ottawa’s first venture capital company, in the late 1970s. Noranda “participated in nearly every successful high technology company that was ever formed in the Ottawa-Carlton Region” (Doyle, 1993: 12). However, Noranda and the other investors provided expansion capital. The only source of start-up finance was therefore from business angels.​[3]​ A survey of high tech start-ups founded since 1965 (but primarily between 1978 and 1982) found that few had raised external finance, none had raised venture capital and the most important source of funding was the personal savings of their founders (Steed and Nichol, 1985).

As recently as 1996 the Canadian Venture Capital Association (CVCA) directory listed just two venture capital companies in Ottawa: a branch office of the Business Development Bank, a Crown Corporation which provides both debt and equity finance to Canadian SMEs via a network of branch offices, and Capital Alliances, a Labor Sponsored Venture Capital Fund, started by the former managing partner of Noranda Enterprises which had closed in the early 1990s.​[4]​ Moreover, venture capital firms in other parts of Canada and the USA showed no interest in investing in Ottawa. The 1997 Ottawa Venture Capital Fair was the first to attract non-local investors. For much of the 1990s the only significant supplier of venture capital in Ottawa was Newbridge Networks, founded in 1986 by the entrepreneur Terry Matthews (who had previously co-founded Mitel with Michael Cowpland who went on to found Corel). Newbridge was acquired by Alcatel in 2000. The Newbridge Affiliates Programme was essentially a form of corporate venture capital. The affiliates were companies developing products that were compatible with  Newbridge equipment and so could leverage Newbridge’s sales force. The affiliates programme provided these companies with direct investment by Newbridge and also by Matthews himself, as well as mentoring and ongoing support, including back office functions. The affiliates programme was wound down in the late 1990s. However, Matthews continued his involvement in venture capital by establishing Celtic House, initially with offices in Ottawa and London, but it subsequently opened a further office in Toronto. He was the only investor in the first fund but Celtic House’s 2nd and 3rd funds have raised funding from a variety of investors.


4.4.3	The Recent Boom in Venture Capital Investing
The availability of venture capital in Ottawa has been transformed since the late 1990s. Indeed, $1.2 billion (Can) was invested in Ottawa-based businesses in 2000, equivalent to 25% of the Canadian total, four times larger than the 1999 figure and seven times bigger than in 1997. The post-2000 tech-downturn has seen a drop in the scale of venture capital investment (in part linked to declining valuations). Nevertheless, even in the downturn Ottawa continued to attract a disproportionate share of Canadian venture capital activity.

This growth in venture capital investing has two sources. First, there has been an increase in the number of Ottawa-based venture capital funds, including several local funds (in many cases started by ex-Newbridge staff who had been involved in the affiliates programme) and branch offices of Canadian venture capital funds. In addition, other Canadian and US venture capital firms put people on the ground to act as their ‘eyes and ears’. Second, a number of investors based elsewhere in Canada and the US – notably in Toronto and Boston – started investing in Ottawa-based businesses. In most cases – and especially in the case of US investors – these investors have been brought in by the original investors to provide second or third round funding. 

Accompanying this growth in venture capital investing has a significant expansion in the population of business angels. This has been a direct consequence of the many successful, cashed-out entrepreneurs since the mid-1990s and the large number of senior executives from the large company sector (e.g. Nortel, Newbridge, JDS-Uniphase) who have made significant money from stock options, Moreover, these angels – unlike those who funded earlier generations of technology start-ups such as Mitel and Lumonics – are technologically savvy and are investing in areas that they understand and are able to bring commercial know how to support the entrepreneurs that they are funding. One of the value-added contributions that business angels can provide is to make introductions to venture capital funds. Indeed, Madill et al. (2005) noted that 57% of technology-based firms which raised angel financing went on to raise finance from venture capital funds; in comparison, only 10% of firms that had not secured angel funding obtaining venture capital. This reflects the role of business angels in building up start up companies to the point where they become ‘investor ready’. The reputation of a business angel can also be a positive signal to venture capital funds. Indeed, one local venture capitalist observed that he has invested in firms “largely because of the quality of their angels” (quoted in Mason et al., 2002: 267).
. 
There are four interrelated factors which account for this recent interest amongst venture capitalists in investing in Ottawa (Mason et al., 2002). First, several contextual factors favoured Ottawa. The venture capital industry experienced a boom in fund-raising in the second half of the 1990, fuelled by a ‘hot’ IPO market and an active takeover market for young technology companies. Thus, there was plenty of money looking for profitable opportunities. In particular, US venture capitalists were finding that the money they had to invest was outstripping the investment opportunities available locally, so they began to look further afield (cf. Green, 2004). One of the key sectors in which venture capitalists were interested in was communications – voice, data, telephony and infrastructure businesses. These were precisely the sectors in which Ottawa was strong. Venture capital firms which specialised in communications technology recognised that Ottawa has an international reputation for world class technology in this area and knew that they could not overlook the region as a source of potential opportunities. Two of Ottawa’s own venture capital funds – Celtic House and Skypoint Capital – also specialise in communications technology.

Second, the sale of three young venture capital-backed companies in 1997 and 1998 for what at the time were extremely high valuations demonstrated to the venture capital community that, in the words of one local investor, “Ottawa is a great place to make money.” A further important consequence was that the monetary rewards of the entrepreneurs and staff in these companies (through stock options) had a dramatic effect on the attitude of engineers in the large companies, making them much more positive about towards starting, or working in, young technology company. Hence, it became much easier for venture capitalists to attract people from major local companies to build strong start-up teams. 

Third, the success of global companies based in Ottawa, such as Nortel, JDS-Uniphase and Newbridge Networks, gave the region high visibility for the quality of its technology and engineers. This attracted the attention of US venture capitalists in particular, giving Ottawa-based entrepreneurs the credibility to get a hearing from venture capitalists. One former local economic development official responsible for Ottawa’s Venture Capital Fair noted that “when [entrepreneurs] call and say, ‘we’re from Ottawa and we’re working in this area’, they get attention … because Ottawa is now really on their map.” He went on to quote from a US venture capitalist who told him that “if you see a deal involving ex-Nortel guys, I want to see it.”  Indeed, by the late 1990s US venture capitalists were visiting Ottawa “looking for ex-Nortel engineers or whatever engineers and funding their ideas.” Interestingly, Boston-based venture capitalists have invested in Ottawa despite having no physical presence there. However, the flight time is only an hour-and-a-half – and because of Ottawa’s small size could quickly get plugged into the local networks. 

Finally, Toronto-based venture capitalists also invested in Ottawa from a distance. Ottawa is an hour’s flying time from Toronto, close enough for Toronto-based venture capitalists to do a day’s business. However, by the late 1990s many Toronto-based venture capitalists were finding this model of investing to be problematic. They were unable to match the valuations paid by US venture capitalists for young technology companies. Moreover, the large size of many US funds meant that they did not need to syndicate the deal, thus excluding Canadian venture capital funds from the investment. This prompted the recognition amongst Toronto venture capitalists that they needed to invest at an earlier stage, ahead of the US investors, and therefore already be an investor in companies when it raised a subsequent round of finance. To do this required a local presence in order to improve their deal referral sources.





This chapter has drawn attention to the strong geographical effects that characterise venture capital investing, contradicting the economist’s concept of perfectly mobile capital markets (Florida and Smith, 1991). Although venture capital firms can, and do, raise their investment funds from anywhere, there are strong geographical constraints on where they make their investments. First, investing locally is a way minimising uncertainty and reducing risk in identifying and evaluating investment opportunities and supporting their investee companies. In particular, the hands-on involvement of venture capitalists encourages local investing. These considerations may also encourage the relocation of new firms seeking finance from other regions which lack venture capital. Second, a significant proportion of venture capital is invested over long distances. However, because this investment is typically invested alongside other venture capital firms, and requires a local investor to co-ordinate the syndicate and undertake the distance sensitive functions, it is highly constrained in where it can flow. Indeed, most long distance venture capital investments flow to major high tech clusters which already contain significant clusters of venture capital firms and investment activity. The effect is therefore to reinforce the geographical concentration of venture capital investing. It is for these same reasons that regions which lack local venture capitalists will encounter difficulties in accessing venture capital from afar. Third, the concentration of venture capital investing creates a virtuous circle in which knowledge and learning about venture capital spreads to local entrepreneurs and intermediaries, resulting in increased demand for venture capital. The exact opposite occurs in venture capital deficient regions where knowledge and understanding of this type of finance in the business community will be weak, so entrepreneurs will be less inclined to seek it and intermediaries will be less competent in getting their clients investment ready. 

Given the positive effect that venture capitalists have on new firm formation and growth, as both capitalist and catalyst, the effect of the geographical clustering of their investments, in turn, contributes to uneven regional economic development. In the case of Silicon Valley, for example, proximity to abundant sources of venture capital enables firms to raise finance at a younger age, complete more funding rounds and raise more money at each round. This translates into better performance: faster growth, profitability, greater employment and a highly likelihood of achieving an IPO.​[5]​ By having early access to venture capital this gives start-ups substantial first-mover advantages, enabling pioneer firms to quickly transform ideas into marketable products and become industry leaders (Zhang, 2006). 

4.5.2	Future Research Directions
The geographies of venture capital have been largely ignored by those scholars who have approached the topic from entrepreneurial and finance perspectives. It has also attracted surprisingly limited attention from economic geographers despite the growing interest in the geography of money (Martin, 1999; Pollard, 2003). Hence, are a lot of  significant research questions which need to be addressed. It is inevitable that any research agenda is personal and idiosyncratic. Based on the material that has been reviewed in this chapter, five topics are identified as priorities for further research.

First, considering business angels, there is a need for research which can “put boundaries on our ignorance” (Wetzel, 1986: 132): for example, better quality statistical information the locational distribution of business angels, the characteristics of business angels in different locations, the circumstances in which long-distance investments occur (assessing the roles of investor characteristics, investment characteristics and local environment), and how angels who make long-distance investments mitigate the locational challenges. These are fairly straightforward questions but pose considerable challenges simply because of the difficulties in obtaining comprehensive statistical information on business angels and their investment activity.

Second, most geographical analyses of venture capital investing have used highly aggregate data. Future studies need to make use of databases, such as Thomson Financial’s Venture Expert Database, which contains a range of information on companies which have received venture capital, and their investors, thereby permitting a much greater range of geographical questions to be explored.

Third, moving from the macro scale, and quantitative data, to the micro-scale and qualitative data, there is a need for greater insights into the way in which both business angels and venture capital firms factor location and distance into their investment decisions. Even though most investors – particularly those who specialise in early stage investing – emphasise the importance of investing locally, ‘exceptions’ are not hard to find (Mason and Rogers, 1996). This might suggest that the location of the potential investee is a compensatory factor, waived if other aspects of the investment are particularly favourable. This is likely to require ‘real time’ research methodologies (see Harrison, Chapter 3). More generally, there is a need to explore the spatial biases of investors which influence their attitudes to investment opportunities in different locations.

Fourth, there is a need to tease out the connections between venture capital and technology clusters. There are two particular issues. The first concerns the popular view that venture capital is a pre-condition for the emergence of technology clusters. This chapter has highlighted the case of Ottawa, and cited several other studies, which clearly demonstrate that venture capital lags cluster development, with the funding of the early generations of spin-off companies being undertaken by various actors, including business angels, established companies and government, and subsequently may attract venture capitalists located in other regions who make and monitor their investments on a fly-in, fly-out basis. Local sources of venture capital only emerge when a critical mass of entrepreneurial activity is reached, the cluster develops an identity of its own, entrepreneurial success stories begin to emerge and the quality of the region’s technology is recognised. More research is needed to explore these processes. 

The second concerns the process of knowledge spillovers in clusters. Firms that are located in clusters derive competitive advantages by gaining rapid access to knowledge on innovation, production techniques and competitive strategies of other firms. This knowledge, which is tacit and therefore difficult to transfer, circulates mainly by inter-personal contact. Research tended to focus on three main processes: the mobility of technically-qualified workers within the local labour market, the spin-off process, involving individuals or teams leaving their existing employers to start new businesses, and various forms of co-operative behaviour between firms in the cluster (e.g. suppliers, sub-contractors, strategic alliances). It has not considered the role of venture capitalists as either a generator or diffuser of information. However, as this chapter has emphasised, venture capitalists sit at the centre of an extended network in which they share information with other investors, entrepreneurs, corporate financiers, head-hunters, consultants and experts. This provides them with deep knowledge about likely technological and market trends in particular industries which they draw upon to make decisions on what to invest in and what not to invest in supporting their portfolio of investee companies. How this shapes the trajectory of technology clusters is an important issue for research. 

Finally, the venture capital industry is dynamic and as it has matured it has become more heterogeneous. Research therefore needs to avoid extrapolating from what happens in Silicon Valley, or even the USA and to examine venture capital investing practices in different regions. There is also a need to recognise that investment processes and practices change over the course of the investment cycle and that this produces different geographies (as Green, 2004, demonstrated). Research must also distinguish between ‘venture capital’ – which can be defined as investing in new and growing entrepreneurial businesses – and ‘private equity’ – which involves investing in established companies which typically require restructuring and often takes the form of management buy-outs (MBOs) in which the incumbent management along with the investors purchase their division or subsidiary from the parent group to become co-owners. Venture capital and private equity have different geographies (Mason and Harrison, 2002) and their local and regional impacts are also very different. Fundamentally venture capital is providing finance which is used for investment in growth whereas private equity is providing finance to enable ownership change to occur. Moreover, private equity deals are typically highly leveraged – in other words, they have a high long-term debt component which is secured against the future cash flows of the business to pay shareholders. Such businesses have to generate cash in order to service this debt. This might involve asset sales. If they are unable to service the debt then they will have to cut back on investment which may lead to loss of market share and, in turn, to a decline in operating efficiencies and ultimately to financial distress. Wrigley (1999: 205) has shown in the case of the US retail sector that the transformation of the capital structures of firms can have “vital implications for the economic landscape, both directly, through the spatial reorganisation of the activities of the high-leveraged firm, and indirectly, through the restructuring of markets by rival firms responding to the commitments implicit in those transformations. … Divestiture, market consolidation and avoidance, … spatial predation, market entry, expansion and exit … and competitive price response by rival firms … are just some of the outcomes.” Researchers also need to be alert to the changing nature of the venture capital industry. Two trends are particularly significant. First, venture capital has been growing in popularity as an asset class amongst financial institutions. One of the consequences is that funds have substantially larger amounts of money under management. This, in turn has driven up both the minimum and average size of investments and led to an increasing emphasis on later stage investments in established businesses which have larger capital needs than start-ups. Second, there has been a shift from generalist to specialist investors who focus on specific industry ‘spaces’ (either vertical or horizontal). Both trends can be expected to have geographical consequences, notably a weakening in the significance of local investing (Mason et al, 2002).

4.5.3	Policy Implications
This evidence concerning the catalytic effect which venture capital has on business start-up and growth has prompted Governments to see venture capital as an essential ingredient in their efforts to promote technology-led economic development in lagging regions. However, as Florida and Kenney (1988b: 316-7) observed, “simply making venture capital available will not magically generate the conditions under which high technology entrepreneurship will flourish.” In similar vein, Zook (2005) comments that “simply pumping additional capital into a region will not necessarily produce the dynamism of established venture capital centres.” First, as Venkataraman (2004) notes, venture capital needs to be combined with talented individuals – typically business executives who can generate and develop novel ideas, start companies, make the prototype, obtain the first customer, develop products and markets and compete in the rough and tumble of competitive markets. This, in turn, will generate some successes which provide the role models for others. Without such a flow of high risk-high return businesses, private sector venture capitalists will not invest and wealthy local investors will shun becoming business angels and invest in other asset classes instead. Second, it has been repeatedly emphasised that providing money is only part of the role of venture capitalists. Hence, using public money to create ‘venture capital’ funds which are staffed by managers who lack the value-added skills of venture capitalists will be ineffective. According to Venkataraman (2004: 154) the money will flow “straight to low-quality ventures.” However, as the example of Ottawa highlighted, regions which do offer good investment opportunities will attract venture capital. The implication for venture capital deficient regions is therefore clear. Trying artificially to create a regional pool of venture capital is likely to be ineffective. Venture capital will only be attracted to places with novel ideas and talented individuals (Venkataraman et al., 2004). Instead, policy-makers should concentrate on developing the region’s technology base, encourage business start-up and growth, and enhance the business support infrastructure. Specifically this means investing in the region’s research institutions to develop knowledge in which it has some comparative advantage - to attract talented individuals from other regions and generate a steady flow of novel technical ideas – and initiatives which enhance the entrepreneurial culture of the region and raise the entrepreneurial competences of the population (Venkataraman et al., 2004).  As one long-term participant and latterly an observer of Ottawa’s high tech cluster observed, referring to venture capitalists: “if you build it they will come” (quoted in Mason et al., 2002: 277).
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^1	  Notably private equity firms which invest in large companies to facilitate their restructuring.
^2	  Vancouver, Victoria, Kitchener-Waterloo, Calgary, Edmonton, Ottawa, Greater Toronto Area, Montréal and Québec City. These cities accounted for 45% of Canada’s population at the 2001 Census of Population.
^3	  For example, Mitel was started with seed money from local lawyers while Lumonics raised its money from local businessmen (“retailers, lawyers and car lot owners”: Mittelstaedt, 1980).
^4	  Noranda Enterprises - the only Ottawa-based venture capital company listed in the 1992 CVCA directory - was closed down in the early 1990s following acquisition of the parent company in the late 1980s. Its new owners saw it as a resources company and so in 1992 closed its investment activities (despite having achieved a 38% compound rate of return to shareholders: Doyle, 1991; 1993).
^5	  However, venture capital-backed firms in Silicon Valley also have lower survival rates. Zhang (2006) suggests this may reflect the lack of prudent screening. A more plausible explanation may be the competition between venture capital firms for investment opportunities leading to over-investment in specific markets.
